
The Truth About Al for Research and Education Institutions

Cyber Summit 2023 – 08 Nov 2023



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THE STRATEGIC COUNSEL

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A REPORT TO CIRA

CYBERSECURITY

August 2023



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
PERCEPTIONS AND ATTITUDES OF CANADIAN ORGANIZATIONS TOWARD

Key Findings

• 68% of organizations worried about cyber threats from generative AI, but only 32% have an AI policy in place.



you most concerned about?





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
BACKGROUND

CIRA Cybersecurity Survey 2023

Key Findings

- 68% of organizations worried about cyber threats from generative AI, but only 32% have an AI policy in place.
- Among organizations affected by a ransomware attack, 70% indicated that they paid the ransom demands. Out of those that paid the ransom, nearly one quarter (22 per cent) paid between \$50K \$100K.
- 40% experienced a data breach last year employee and/or customer (an 11 per cent increase from 2022).
- Nearly 30 per cent of organizations experienced a loss of revenue as a result of a cyber attack (up from 17 per cent in 2022), and **24% experienced** damage to their reputation.
- Organizations face cyber risks by relying on outdated technology, with **37%** of firms using technology released prior to 2010.







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
BACKGROUND Cyber-Physical Security

IOT ANALYTICS The evolution of IT-OT convergence 1980/90s 2000s 1970s Information Mainframe technology (IT) ERP Internet, ERP modules, MES, etc. Integrated architecture Fieldbus protocols, TCP/IP Remote I/O Industrial Logical Controller Automation (OT) Robotics Direct digital control


ERP = Enterprise Resource Planning MES = Manufacturing Execution System SCADA = Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition PLC = Programmable Logic Controller I/O = Input/Output signals Source: IoT Analytics



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
BACKGROUND Cyber-Physical Security – Purdue Model





rise Desktops	SOC	SIEM
Server (Host)		
Server (remote)		

BACKGROUND AI vs. ML vs. DL





AI & CYBERSECURITY An Already Long History


Existing Benefits

- Handle billions and trillions of events (Big Data)
- Identify patterns and antipatterns / anomalies
- Automate & orchestration response

g Data) halies

AI & CYBERSECURITY CIRA Cybersecurity Survey 2023


you most concerned about?





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AI & CYBERSECURITY


Y2Q

W W W . C I R A . C A





AI & CYBERSECURITY Y2Q Timeline





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Long

LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND FRAMEWORKS The Difference









LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND FRAMEWORKS CMMC + CPCSC

CMMC (Cyber Security Maturity Model Certification)


- US DoD framework aligned with NIST, etc.
- CMMC 2.0 now out
 - (5 levels -> 3 levels)

CPCSC (Canadian Program for Cyber Security Certification)

- Aligned with CMMC
- Mandatory for defence contracts as early as winter 2024



FACING CYBER ATTACKS MITRE ATT&CK





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)S	Software Ca	mpaigns Re	sources -	Blog 🖸	Contribute	Search C
	View on the Version Pern	ATT&CK [®] Naviga nalink	ator æ			
d ol s	Inhibit Response Function	Impair Process Control 5 techniques	Impact			
	Activate Firmware	Brute Force I/O	Damage to	7		
	Update Mode Alarm Suppression	Modify Parameter	Property Denial of Contro			
	Block Command	Module	Denial of View			
	Message	Firmware	Loss of			
	Block Reporting Message	Spoof Reporting Message	Availability	-		
	Block Serial COM	Unauthorized Command	Loss of Control	-		
	Change Credential	Message	Productivity and Revenue			
	Data Destruction		Loss of	-		
	Denial of Service		Protection	_		
	Device Restart/Shutdown		Loss of Safety	_		
	Manipulate I/O Image		Loss of View Manipulation of	-		
	Modify Alarm Settings		Control	_		
	Rootkit		Manipulation of View			
	Service Stop		Theft of			
	System Firmware		Operational Information			



ICES

Home > Matrices > ICS

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ICS Ma Below are the ta		iques represent	ing the MITRE /	ATT&CK [®] Matrix f	for ICS.				Version Pern	ATT&CK® Naviga nalink	
Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Evasion	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command and Control	Inhibit Response Function	Impair Process Control	Impact
12 techniques	9 techniques	6 techniques	2 techniques	6 techniques	5 techniques	7 techniques	11 techniques	3 techniques	14 techniques	5 techniques	12 techniques
Drive-by Compromise	Change Operating	Hardcoded Credentials	Exploitation for Privilege	Change Operating Mode	Network Connection	Default Credentials	Adversary-in- the-Middle	Commonly Used Port	Activate Firmware Update Mode	Brute Force I/O	Damage to Property
Exploit Public-	Mode	Modify Program	Escalation	Exploitation for	Enumeration	Exploitation of	Automated	Connection	Alarm Suppression	Modify Parameter	Denial of Contro
Facing Application	Command-Line Interface	Module Firmware	Hooking	Evasion Indicator	Network Sniffing	Remote Services	Collection Data from	Proxy Standard	Block Command Message	Module Firmware	Denial of View
Exploitation of Remote Services	Execution through API	Project File		Removal on Host	Remote System Discovery	Hardcoded Credentials	Information Repositories	Application Layer Protocol	Block Reporting	Spoof Reporting	Loss of Availability
External Remote	Graphical User	Infection		Masquerading	Remote System	Lateral Tool	Data from Local		Message	Message	Loss of Control
Services	Interface	System Firmware		Rootkit	Information Discovery	Transfer	System		Block Serial COM	Unauthorized Command	Loss of
Internet Accessible	Hooking	Valid Accounts		Spoof Reporting Message	Wireless	Program Download	Detect Operating Mode		Change Credential	Message	Productivity and Revenue
Device	Modify Controller	Wessage		message	Sniffing	Remote	I/O Image		Data Destruction		Loss of
Remote Services	Tasking			Sni		Services	Monitor Process		Denial of Service		Protection
Replication Through	Native API					Valid Accounts	State		Device Restart/Shutdown		Loss of Safety
Removable Media	Scripting						Point & Tag Identification		Manipulate I/O Image		Loss of View
Rogue Master	User Execution								Modify Alarm		Manipulation of Control
Spearphishing							Program Upload		Settings		
Attachment							Screen Capture		Rootkit		Manipulation of View
Supply Chain Compromise							Wireless Sniffing		Service Stop		Theft of
Transient Cyber Asset									System Firmware		Operational Information
Wireless Compromise											

FACING CYBER ATTACKS

TTPs

TECHNIQUES		ICS Techniqu	Ies						
nterprise	~		adversary achieves a tactical goal by performing an action. For example, an a	dversary may dump	Techniques: 81				
Mobile	~	credentials to achieve credentia	l access.	S	ub-techniques: 0				
CS	^	ID Name	Description						
Initial Access	~	T0800 Activate Firmware	Adversaries may activate firmware update mode on devices to prevent e	MITRE ATT&CK		Mat	trices - Tactics - Techniques -	Data Sources Mitigations - Groups Software	Campaigns Resources - Blog C Contribute
Execution	~	Update Mode	reaction to an emergency or process malfunction. For example, devices						
Persistence	~		mode designed for firmware installation. This mode may halt process m firmware to be loaded. A device left in update mode may be placed in an	TACTICS	Home > Tactic	s > ICS			
Privilege Escalation	~		to it. By entering and leaving a device in this mode, the adversary may de	Enterprise 🗸					
Evasion	~	T0830 Adversary-in-the-	Adversaries with privileged network access may seek to modify network	Mobile 🗸		ICS tactics			
Discovery	~	Middle	(AiTM) attacks. This type of attack allows the adversary to intercept traf	ICS ^		Tactics represent the "why" o	f an ATT&CK technique or sub-technique	e. It is the adversary's tactical goal: the reason for performing	
Lateral Movement	^		network. If a AiTM attack is established, then the adversary has the abili communication stream. There are several ways to accomplish this attac	Initial Access		an action. For example, an ad	lversary may want to achieve credential	access.	ICS Tactics: 12
Default Credentials			Resolution Protocol (ARP) poisoning and the use of a proxy.	Execution		ID Name	Description		
Exploitation of Remote S	Services	T0878 Alarm Suppression	Adversaries may target protection function alarms to prevent them from	Persistence					
Hardcoded Credentials			messages may be a part of an overall reporting system and of particular	Privilege Escalation		TA0108 Initial Access	The adversary is trying to get in	nto your ICS environment.	
Lateral Tool Transfer			system does not imply the disruption of the reporting system as a whole	Evasion		TA0104 Execution	The adversary is trying to run c	ode or manipulate system functions, parameters, and data in an un	nauthorized way.
Program Download		T0802 Automated Collection	Adversaries may automate collection of industrial environment informat	Discovery		TA0110 Persistence	The adversary is trying to main	tain their foothold in your ICS environment.	
Remote Services		Collection	collection may leverage native control protocols and tools available in th the OPC protocol may be used to enumerate and gather information. Ac	Lateral Movement					
Valid Accounts			protocols may allow collection and enumeration of other attached, com	Collection		TA0111 Privilege Escala	tion The adversary is trying to gain	higher-level permissions.	
Collection	~	T0803 Block Command	Adversaries may block a command message from reaching its intended	Command and Control		TA0103 Evasion	The adversary is trying to avoid	l security defenses.	
Command and Control	~	Message	networks, command messages are sent to provide instructions to contro message can inhibit response functions from correcting a disruption or	Inhibit Response Function		TA0102 Discovery	The adversary is locating infor	nation to access and identify their targets in your environment	
nhibit Response Function	~			Impair Process Control		TAUTUZ DISCOVELY	The adversary is locating infor	nation to assess and identify their targets in your environment.	
' Impair Process Control	~	T0804 Block Reporting Message	Adversaries may block or prevent a reporting message from reaching its messages contain telemetry data (e.g., I/O values) pertaining to the curr	Impact		TA0109 Lateral Moveme	The adversary is trying to move	e through your ICS environment.	
Impact	~	moorgo	process. By blocking these reporting messages, an adversary can poten			TA0100 Collection	The adversary is trying to gathe	er data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment	t to inform their
-							goal.		
						TA0101 Command and	The adversary is trying to comr	nunicate with and control compromised systems, controllers, and p	platforms with
						Control	access to your ICS environmen	t.	
						TA0107 Inhibit Response	e The adversary is trying to preve	ent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervent	ntion functions from
						Function	responding to a failure, hazard,		
						TA0106 Impair Process	The adversary is trying to mani	pulate, disable, or damage physical control processes.	
						Oentrel		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	



FACING CYBER ATTACKS What to Look For

Top Artifacts Used in Each Stage of MITRE Attack Chain Command Exfiltration Collection Impact ent Л Cobalt Strike Data Network Rclone Browsing Encrypted Network WinRAR Rclone PowerShell trike Breach SOPHOS

	-				Stages of M	ITRE Attack	
Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Latera Moveme
	\bigcirc	H L Q		Ē	0 2 =		۴
	_				Artif	acts	
Remote Services	PowerShell	Cobalt Strike	Mimikatz	PowerShell	Mimikatz	Advanced IP Scanner	RDP
Exploits	PsExec	AnyDesk	ProcDump	Rundll32.exe	ProcDump	Netscan	Cobalt Sti



FACING CYBER ATTACKS MITRE ATT&CK Heatmap

Reconne	alssance		ource opment	Initial	Access	Exec	ution	Persis	stence		ilege lation	Defense Evasion Credential Access		ess Discovery		Lateral N	Lateral Movement		ection		and and htrol	Exfilt	Exfiltration		pact		
T1598	T1591	T1584	T1585	T1195	T1200	T1559	T1153	T1525	T1574	T1574	T1078	T1211	T1202	T1111	T1110	T1810	T1815	T1570	T1550	T1185	T1039	T1090	T1843	T1052	T1567	T1489	T1491
T1589	T1596	T1586	T1587	T1078	T1133	T1569	T1072	T1554	T1078	T1543	T1034	T1574	T1112	T1539	T1212	T1887	T1518	T1091	T1072	T1825	T1114	T1132	T1826	T1537	T1841	T1498	T1531
T1592	T1594	T1583	T1588	T1091	T1566	T1105	T1175	T1197	T1542	T1134	T1037	T1497	T1036	T1187	T1048	T1869	T1883	T1021	T1175	T1113	T1119	T1104	T1219	T1829	T1028	T1486	T1496
T1595	T1590	T1688		T1189	T1199	T1847	T1861	T1133	T1543	T1865	T1053	T1078	T1197	T1556	T1528	T1526	T1482	T1563	T1088	T1115	T1123	T1008	T1095	T1030	T1848	T1485	T1499
T1597	T1593			T1198		T1853	T1859	T1034	T1136	T1548	T1547	T1216	T1550	T1558	T1003	T1497	T1818	T1210	T1534	T1213	T1874	T1092	T1573	T1011		T1490	T1561
						T1689	T1610	T1556	T1505	T1484	T1611	T1542	T1578	T1555	T1686	T1849	T1580	T1051		T1560	T1530	T1568	T1071			T1529	T1495
						T1283	T1864	T1037	T1862	T1546	T1055	T1553	T1221	T1056	T1557	T1057	T1538			T1682	T1005	T1105	T1102			T1565	
						T1129	T1284	T1137	T1108			T1599	T1134	T1552		T1135	T1217			T1856	T1557	T1572	T1571				
								T1176	T1053			T1218	T1556			T1201	T1124			T1125		T1205	T1001				
								T1205	T1098			T1140	T1220			T1882	T1833										
								T1547	T1546			T1149	T1127			T1849	T1613										
												T1108 T1535	T1222 T1207			T1845	T1120 T1614										
												T1006	T1205			T1007											
												T1488	T1548														
												T1612	T1610														
												T1484	T1564														
												T1562	T1070														
												T1601	T1827														
												T1055	T1814														
												T1864	T1688														
											Legend Tit	le															
										0			50)			100	111									



CONCLUSION Don't Panic – Do Act Now

Key Takeaways

- Non-technical impacts (IP, regulatory, and confidentiality) are equally major Al concerns.
- The impact of AI and quantum computing on cybersecurity (beyond Y2Q) gets hard to predict.
- This is the worst AI will ever be...







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CYBER-PHYSICAL SECURITY Pivot Points

